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IN ITHE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ELI.JIS and \'IRGlNI~\
l~:LLTS, LOEij T. IIEP,~VORTII and
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1

Plaint·iffs and Appellants,

-vs.1\:.ARL B. liAijE and DELSA G.
1-LALE, ROY A. BARRETT and
RUTH R. BARRETT, J. THEOD()RE ELDERS, JR., and LOIS H.
ELDERS, RALPH D. FISHER and
BARBARA H. F,ISHER-, LEGRAND
P. BACI(~l1\N and .illJL,TON Yr.
B.A.Cl(~LA.N, d.b.a. BACKMAN AB~rrR.A.CT AND TITLE C01IP ANY,

Case No. 9537

De.feudants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RF.JSPONDENTS
Respondents agree 'Yith the stateinent of the nature
of the case, \Yith the statPd disposition of same, the relief
sought a:-.; ~et forth in appellants' brief, and that the
state1nent of facts substantially recites the allegations
contained in the second an1ended complaint.
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As a further statement the attention of the Honorable Court is directed to the fact that defendants Karl
B. Hale and Delsa G. Hale, his wife, who owned the properties affected by this action, did on October 15th, 1958
make gifts to three of their children, two of whom are
named as grantee:s in deeds of properties described in
paragraphs 14th and 15th. These deeds were made and
delivered by Karl B. Hale and his wife following a pattern adopted by them in reducing their estate, by each
year conveying properties to their children. (R. 14). Defendants Karl B. Hale and Delsa G. Hale had no right,
title or interest in and to the property described in the
deeds, the subject of this action, after the deeds hereinabove mentioned were delivered to their children.
Defendants Fishers and Elders were parties to but
one deed each, therefore there could be no violation of
any law or ordinance on the part of these defendants.
None of defendants have been found guilty of
violating any la\v or ordinance. X or does it appear fron1
the pleadings that any one of the defendants made any
statement to induce plaintiffs to act, "'"hich statement "~as
false, but plaintiff~ rely on that "~hich they claim was
an on1ission on the part of defendants to ad-vise plaintiffs
of the status of the prop-erties.
As to defendants Le Grand P. Backlnan and ~Iilton
l'". Backman, dba Baelrman Abstract and Title Company
it is alleged that a prelin1inary title report \Vas issued by
said eon1pany and that it \Yas not di8elosed by the report
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that the property \vas not \\·ithin a recorded subdivision.
Appellants do not charge that the title co1npany certified
to a description of property as being within a subdivision.
Defendant Ada1n ~1. Duncan conferred 'vith the Planning and Zoning l~o1nmission in co1npany \vith defendant
l(arl B. llale. Duncan had no conversation with Karl B.
Hale p-rior to Duncan':-; having acquired title to the property (R. 34).
The plat of the proposed subdivision does not bear
the signature of anyone representing themselves to be
the own·ers of the property.
Plaintiffs do not charge that they have been disturbed in possession of the property described in the
deeds, their only complaint is that they were denied
building permits.
The property, the subject of this action, fronts on a
present county road.
ARGlJ~lENT

POINT I.
THE SECOND AlVIENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO
STATE A CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENTS UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

It cannot be determined from the con1plaint "\vhether
appellants rely on acts of fraud or misrepresentation on
the part of defendants-respondents, or 'vhether appellants
rely on breach of warranty of title. If appellants rely
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on fraud then under Rule 9b URCP appellants are required to state the acts of fraud on which they rely with
particularity. This appellants have not done. If appellants rely on breach of warranty of title as against respondents who "\\ ere grantors in the deeds, the subject
of this action, then it is necessary to read into the warranty deed that which the statute does not imply. Appellants have not alleged facts sufficient to sho'v the violation of any ordinance relied upon or of the violation of
any law, nothing but bare legal conclusions.
7

There is no allegation of failure of title or of appellants having been disturbed in possession, neither is
there any allegation that the title is encumbered. The
only allegation is that appellants have been unable to
obtain building permits to construct homes on the properties described in the deeds.
Appellants allege the deeds refer to lots in :Jiount
Olympus Park No. 5. The deeds on "yhich appellants rely
and base their action do not recite any subdivision but
on the contrary each deed contains a meets and bounds
description as alleged by appellants in paragraphs 15th,
16th, and 17th of the second an1ended con1plaint. Therefore it is clear there is nothing before the court bearing
out the allegations that the deeds n1ade reference to or
caused reference to be 1nade to a certain purported plan
or plat by a subdiv"ision, to-"yit, .Jlount Olyn1pus Park
No. 5.
As to the allegations purporting to state a cause of
action against Defendants Barkman~ appellants allege
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that defendant ~Tilton \'. Baclnnan prepared all of the
deeds. That this defendant "·a~ a\Yare that Duncan
thought he \\·as purchasing 3 building lots although said
defendant knew that the lots \\'Pre not part of an approved
subdivision he \vholly failed to disclose this fact to said
Duncan. This allegation is contradictory to the allegations contained in paragraphs sixteenth, seventeenth
and eightPenth and is in conflict \Yith the descriptions
contained in the deeds relied upon. Therefore it is apparent Duncan \vas on notice at all tirnes of the fact that
the property \vas not a part of a subdivision.
As to the allegation in paragraph 37th of the issuance of ~~ Interirn Title Insurance Binders,'' it is alleged
that the srune \\·ere delivered to Duncan by Barrett.
There is no allegation of any privity of contract bet\veen
Duncan and defendants, Backman Abstract & Title Co.
The instrt1n1ents relied upon as against these defendants
"·ere not pleaded, and subparagraphs 1, 2 and 3 thereunder contain statements not presmned to be covered by
an Interim Title Insurance Binder. As to the other allegations of the~ complaint purporting to state a cause of
action against defendants Backn1an, the complaint contains no allegations as to the description of the property
contained in the title policy purportedly issued or in the
binder allegedly issued by defendants Backman. Neither
is it alleged that there \v·as privity of contract be~tween
Baclanan and any one of the plaintiffs.
POINT II.
The appellants, in Point II of their brief, contend
that they state a cause of action against all of the defendants named upon t\\·o theories.
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The first of these theories is predicated upon the
proposition that it is negligent to violate certain statutes
and ordinances which are set forth in the appellants'
brief.
There is no question that the Salt Lake County Ordinance set forth in the section referred to of the Utah Code
Annotated are accurate recitations of 'vhat those statutory provisions hold. It should be noted in this connection that the statutory provision referred to creates a
violation or describes a violation as a misdemeanor.
On Page 10 and Page 11 of the appellants' brief
there is set forth the underlying purpose of the county
ordinance which is stipulated therein in the broadest
terms. In neither the county ordinance referred to nor
the state statute is there established in so many words or
expressly any civil action such as the appellants brought
against any violator of the ordinance or the state statute.
The question which arises by reason of Point A in the
appellants' brief contending that negligence can be predicated upon a violation of a statute and ordinance and
thereby give rise to a cause of action in favor of the
appellants and against the defendants.

In sup·port of this proposition, the appellants refer
to ecrtain cases ""hieh purport to hoJd that a violation
of a erirninal statute or ordinance has been recognized
as establishing sorne negligence as a 1natter of la·w... Also,
in sup·port of this proposition, is cited the case of Langlois v. Reese, 10 Utah 2d 272, 331 P 2d 638.
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The appellants' brief uses this language in referring
to the Langlois case :
In the latter case (the Langlois case) this
court indicated that if a violation of a statutP results in da1nage \vhieh the statute is designed to
prevent a supportable rause of action exist;-;.,,
H

The l~anglois case arose out of an automobilepedestrian accident at the intersection of State Street
and First Avenue. The westbound automobile \vas Inaking a left turn from First A venue going south on State
Street \\'"hen the pedestrian was crossing from west to
east, not in a crosswalk, across State Street. The essence
of the case is that the trial court sent the question of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff to the
jury on the question of whether this alleged contributory
negligence \\'"as a proximate cause. The jury found that
it was and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision. But
no\vhere in the decision is any language apparent "·hich
is susceptible of the proposition that the court indicated
a violation of the statute or of a statute creates a supportable cause of action.
Also, in support of this proposition, the ap·pellants
cite in their brief a headnote from Prosser, Torts, 2nd
Edition. The material in Prosser, \Vhich follo\vs this
headnote contains some decisions \Vhich seem to support
the proposition that the violation of a criminal statute,
\\'"ill create a civil action on the part of one who is injured
as a result of the violation of the statute if the plaintiff
is one of a class the statute \Yas designed to protect.
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In connection \vith the citation to Prosser on Torts,
2nd Edition, \vhich is rnade by appellants in their brief,
beginning at Page 154 of the 2nd Edition, the follo\ving
language appears under the general headnote \Yhich has
been submitted to the court:
"It is not every infraction of a statute or an
ordinance which will result in civil liability. Otherwise stated, there are statutes \Yhich are construed
as creating no duty of conduct to"\\rard the plaintiff. The courts have been careful not to exceed
the purpose \vhich they attribute to the legislature.
This judicial self-restraint has served as an argument for those \vho contend that an action cannot
be founded upon a duty to another; hut there is,
of course, a special reason, in the theory of the
separation of po"\\rers, for such reluctance to go
beyond the legislative policy.''
Prosser continues on Page 155 of the 2nd Edition
to say as follovvs :
"In many cases the evident policy of the legislature is to protect only a limited class of individuals, and the plaintiff must bring hin1Self
within that class in order to maintain an actjon
based on the statute."
The purpose of the passage of the rolulty ordinance
which is set forth in the appellants' brief is repeated
here because of the very general language \Yhich is used.
It reads as follo"'"s:
"The underl~'"ing purpose and intent of this
title is to promote the healt11, safet~~, convenienee
and general \Yelfare of the inhabitants of the un-
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incorporated territor~T of the count~T in the 111anner
of the subdivision of land and to encourage the
healthful gro"'th of the county.''
In . .4.kers v. Chicago, St. Paul, Jlihraukee aud Ohio
Jfailway C(nnpaH,IJ, 58 l\[inn. 540, 60 N.,V. 669, the follo\ving state1nent, footnoted in Prosser, occurs:
1

if a defendant owes a duty to someone
else but does not o've it to the person injured, no
action will lie. The duty must be to the person injured. These principles are elementary and are
equally applicable, whether the duty is imposed
by positive statute or is founded on general co1n1non law principals."
~~Even

It is submitted that the general language employed
in the preamble to the Salt Lake County Ordinance does
not in express tern1s or other,vise purport to ereate in
favor of these plaintiffs a civil cause of aetion against
these defendants. The seeond theory advanced by the
appellants in support of their Point II is that a negligent
misrepresentation should give rise to the kind of eause
of action 'vhich the appellants seek to bring here. This
theory on the part of the appellants appears to be based
on the proposition that the defendants, or some of them,
either deliberately misrepresented the facts or negligently
made representations or assertions, the truth of "~hich,
they did not ascertain.
The answer to this theory and contention of the appellants is simply that no representation, or misrepresentation, of the kind contended for by the appellants 'Yas

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
made, nor was there any conscious withholding of information which should have been given to the appellants.
The appellants in this regard seem to rely upon what
they describe as an inference left by the defendants that
the land in question was part of a valid subdivision.
There is no sup·port for the suggestion that an inference
was left or made that the land was part of a valid subdivision. In this connection, also, the appellants refer to
Prosser on Torts, 2nd Edition, Page 541, and say as
follO"\\TS:
HA representation made with an honest belief

in its truth may still be negligent because of lack
of reasonable care and ascertaining the facts, or
in the manner of expression."
This last statement "or in the manner of expression''
1s italicized in the appelants' brief. Their contention
seen1s to be that they 'vere 1nislead by son1e sort of inference or a manner of expression or even a tone of voice.
In this connection, it should be taken into account
that the plaintiff "~ho con1plains most bitterly about tlris
contended or alleged negligent 1nisrepresentation is an
attorney, \vho had equal and Rlllple access to all of the
information concerning the land involved as did the defendants. There is no necessit~~ on the part of the defendants and respondents in this action to rely upon the
doctrine of caveat e1nptor. It seems curious that the attorney to \\'"honl this propert~. \Yas sold n1ade no personal
inquiry 'vith respect to its status as subdivision properly
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or otherwise; does not contend that he even asked concerning its subdivided status and then files a cause of
action based upon inference or ''a manner of expressio."
It is submitted to the court, based upon the foregoing
that the appellants have not stated a cause of action which
can be predicated upon either a violation of a statute or
an ordinance or upon the theory of conscious or negligent
misrepresentation because no such representations \\Tere
ever made.
POINT III.
Under Appellants' Point III sub paragraph ~\-
Fraud, they say the facts alleging the fraud are set out
'vith particularity as required by Rule 9(b) URCP, and
cite Davis Stock Co. v. Hill, 2 U. 2d 20 noteing that the
true facts must be alleged unless they appear obvious
from the pleadings. The lower court in sustaining re:spondents' motion determined that the allegations of
fraud were insufficient and rightly so. Let us examine
the complaint as to the allegations of fraud. Unde:r paragraph lOth appellants allege the lots contained fewer than
the minimum number of square feet allowed by the terms
of the cited ordinance. It is apparent appellants knew or
should have known from the meets and bounds descrip·tion the area the lots contained.
In paragraph 11 appellants alle:ge that title to all of
the properties \Yas in Hales and that the four lots were
transferred to other members of the Hale family prior to
execution of deeds to Barrett (one of the defendants),
Duncan and Ellis. Then in paragraph 12th it is alleged
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that in the spring of 1959, I-Iales, Elders and Fisher conveyed to Barrett three lots identified as 1, 2, and 3, in
consideration of or exchange of some Utah County property, and under paragraph 13th it is alleged that Barrett
and Hale deeded the three lots to Duncan and that certain
of the other defendants (not nan1ed) joined in the deeds.
The only allegations of fraud are contained in Seeond Claim wherein appellants recite certain statements
purportedly made to defendant Barrett and then restated
by Barrett to Duncan. The state1nents allegedly made
even if not hearsay as to Hales are not such statements as
'vill give rise to an action of fraud.
As to representations clain1ed to have been made
by Backmans under the Interin1 Title Report, as heretofore state,d, there are no allegations of any privity of
contract bet,veen then1 and Duncan. Keither are the instruments or any provisions thereof pleaded. The documents are not in evidence nor are they attached to the
pleading as exhibits. There are no allegations to the effect that the title oompany failed to certify to that 'vhich
is a matter of record, neither do appellants allege that
the title company certified to the property as being a
part of a subdivision.
There are no allegations to the effect that it 'vas
represented to Duncan or to his grantees by Hales that
the property ,,. .as a part of a dedicated subdivision.
At page 23 of appellants' brief they say kno,Yledge
of the falsity· to Barrett is not specifically pleaded, but
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it need not be. Tf appellants have stated a cause of action
against Barrett for fraud it is not i1nputed to the other
defendants and Barrett is not d.efending the case.

POINT \T
The contplaint contains no allegations against BackInans to the effect that they insured title to a property
described as a part of subdivision. As stated heretofore,
appellants do not so much as set out any provision of the
Interim Title Report . .£-~ll that appellants do is to allege
Backmans did not disclose the lots were not subdivision
lots. The description contained in the reports will show
a meets and bounds description and that no reference is
made to any subdivision. Appellants refer to defects in
the title reports but fail to point out the particular in
'vhich the defect appears or just what the defect is, they
allege the report did not point out that the property was
subdivision building lots without specifying any provision
of the report requiring the title company to do so.
The case of Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 37 Cal.
2d 644, 23-! P2d 625, 40 ALR 2d 1238 is favorable to defendants Backman. Therein the court said in quoting
from The Coast Jlfutual Bldg. Loan Assn. v. Security
Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 1-± Cal. App. 2d 225, 57 P:Z(l 1392:
"Not only the provisions of the policy as a
'vhole, but also the exceptions to the liability of
the insurer, must be construed so as to give the
insured the protection \Yhich he reasonably had
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a right to expect, and to that end doubts, ambiguities, and uncertainties arising out of the language
used in the policy must be resolved in his favor."
Without the policies relied upon being pleaded or
without pleading the provisions thereof appellants have
not pleaded any cause of action as against Backmans.
The allegations contained in the complaint are· nothing
but bare legal conclusions of the pleaders.

Appellants charge defendants ,,~ith breach of \~Var
ranty. It appears that Barrett is inadvertently referred
to in the introductory paragraph of app·ellants' brief as a
plaintiff.
Appellants have not alleged facts constituting any
breach of warranty of title. The argument on pages 29
and 30 of their brief is not supported by the pleadings,
on the contrar~~ it is clearly evident from the allegations
as contained in paragraphs 16th, 17th and 18th that no
reference to any plat or map is contained in the deeds.
N o\vhere in the pleading does it appear that the grantee
or their successors in interest have been disturbed in
possession of the property covered by the deed. Appellants have cited no authority holding they had no right
to convey the property covered by the deeds, and as to
there not being the "quantity and quality'' purported to
be conveyed the deeds being meets and bounds description
elearly disclose the area covered. Parol evidence could
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not be introduced to alter or to explain same as there is
no ambigUity in the deeds. In/(night v. So. Pac. R. Co., 52
U. 42, 56, 172 P 689 the court said a parol agreement in no
event runs with the land.
The deeds contain a complete description and the notation of Lot number adds nothing to the description and
it will not be considered.
In 2 Devlin on Deeds, Third Ed., Vol. 2 at section
1013a, the law is stated as follows :
"If the land conveyed can be identified by
the other calls of the description an impossible
or senseless course will not be considered. Citing
Brose v. Boise City R.R., 5 Idaho 695."
Se.e also Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed. Vol.
6,Sec.3274,p.445.

POINT VII.
Appellants contend that the action against the grantors in the deeds, the subject of the action, and that pleaded against defendants Backman in their having issued
Interim Title Re·ports arise out of the same transaction,
occurrence or series of transactions or occurences. It
is contended that the issuance of a title report on a tract
of land is not the transaction or occurance contemplated
by the rules.
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Respectfully submitted,

BACJ()LAX,
CLARK

BACK~lAN

&

Attorneys for Respondents, Karl
B. Hale, Delsa G. Hale, Ralph
D. Fisher, Barbara H. Fisher,
LeGrand P. Backnzan, J!ilton
11 • Backn1an, dba Backnzan Abstract and Title Co.

ARTHlTR A. ALLEN", JR.,
Attorney for Respondents, J.
Theodore EldersJ Jr., and Lois
H. Elders.
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